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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the original Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) and
current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, a shareholder seeking to bring a de-
rivative action' against a corporation must first make demand on the corporation,
or show why such demand would be futile or excused. 2 This demand serves as a
formal request to the corporation's board of directors to take over the litigation or
otherwise take action. The futility exception allows the shareholder to forego this
requirement in various situations, including those in which the board or its mem-
bers have a special interest in the action complained of, or are the target of the liti-
gation itself.'
Two distinct and current "proposals" would require a mandatory demand in all
cases, and both would abolish the futility exception. First, amendments to the
RMBCA regarding derivative actions were recently approved by the Committee
on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association.' Under this amended
RMBCA, the futility exception would be abolished, and demand would be re-
quired in every case.' State legislatures are free to add such a proposal to existing
corporate statutes,6 many of which are based on either the RMBCA or the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA). 7 Second, the American Law Institute
1. A derivative action is one brought by a shareholder for the corporation's "benefit," as when a corporation
could assert rights against alleged wrongdoers to the corporation, but does not; whether the injury complained of
may have been caused by parties outside the corporate structure, or by the corporation's own directors and offi-
cers, the plaintiff/shareholder "seeks enforcement of an obligation owed by the corporation to its shareholders
.ROGER J. MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 8.01 (1984) [hereinafter SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION];
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.9 (1985) [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL].
2. The relevant part of the original RMBCA is as follows:
A complaint in a proceeding brought in the right of a corporation must be verified and allege with particu-
larity the demand made, if any, to obtain action by the board of directors and either that the demand was
refused or ignored or why [the person bringing the action] did not make the demand.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40(b) (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA]. The relevant portion of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 reads:
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the share-
holders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
3. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[dlemand is presumptively futile where the directors
are antagonistic, adversely interested, or involved in the transactions attacked."); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779,
787 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (entire board of directors approved and participated in a
"self-interested transaction," demand was presumed futile).
4. The amended RMBCA sections can be found in Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model
Business Corporation Act- Amendments Pertaining to Derivative Proceedings, 45 Bus. LAW. 1241 (1990). For a
further discussion see infru Westtext accompanying notes 113-43. The RMBCA which reflects these amend-
ments is referred to herein as the "amended RMBCA."
5. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, § 7.42, at 1244.
6. The legislatures of Florida and Georgia have enacted statutes based on an earlier version of the amended
RMBCA. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0741 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 14- 2-742 (Harrison Supp.
1989). The earlier version of the amended RMBCA is found in Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the
Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Derivative Proceedings, 44 Bus. LAW. 543 (1989).
See also Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the
Decade, 45 Bus. LAW. 469, 500-01 n.2 18 (1990) [hereinafter Block, Business Judgment Rule].
7. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.40(b) (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-282 to -418 (1987).
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("ALI") has published tentative draft proposals of its Reporters which address
both the demand requirement and additional aspects of derivative proceedings.'
Though the ALl proposal differs in several respects from the amended RMBCA,9
it also would require mandatory demand, absent a showing of irreparable harm to
the corporation.10
The abolition of the futility exception could be cast as a major danger to the
rights of minority shareholders seeking to bring derivative actions. A mandatory
demand requirement could conceivably extend the deference to board decisions
which can be found under the "business judgment rule."" Then again, the change
could be viewed as one of procedure "only"- an altering of the "hoops" through
which one must pass in order to bring such an action. On the other hand, such a
change could bring greater judicial review to all derivative actions, in that courts
might then give a more extensive examination to refusal of a demand made on the
corporation, rather than placing more reliance on the business judgment of the
corporation's board and/or that of a special litigation committee. If such review
was given, perhaps a corporation would have greater difficulty in dispensing with
even the more "frivolous" 2 actions brought against it.
This comment will present an overview of the current status and use of the de-
mand requirement and futility exception, and examine the proposals for the latter's
abolition, and the possible effects which the adoption of such could have on deriv-
ative litigation.
In addition to these proposals, a third attempt at mandatory demand was re-
cently made and then rebuffed. In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., " the
Seventh Circuit abolished the futility exception in cases where the derivative
action is based on federal substantive law.14 A unanimous United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the law of a corporation's state of incorporation
should be applied so long as it is not inconsistent with the federal statute in ques-
8. See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations Tent.
Draft No. 8, at 63-64 (1988) [hereinafter ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8]. This reference contains section 7.03, "Ex-
haustion of Intracorporate Remedies: the Demand Rule." Id. ; see also ALl Tent. Draft No. 8, §§ 7.01-7.02, at
16-63, ALl Tent. Draft No. 8, §§ 7.04-7.15, at 81-233, which contains additional proposals on derivative pro-
ceedings; American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance Tent. Draft No. 9 §§ 7.10 to 7.15 (1989)
[hereinafter ALl, Tent. Draft No. 9].
The ALl demand rule proposal § 7.03 was approved by the ALl membership at its 1988 Annual Meeting. ALI,
Tent. Draft No. 9, at 211 (appendix). However, each ALl Tentative Draft (Nos. 8 and 9) is labeled with disclaim-
ers stating that the proposals do not represent the position of the ALl, and are subject to annual membership ap-
proval. Id. at i. It is assumed here that § 7.03 (the demand rule) is approved as is stated in Tent. Draft No. 9. Id. at
211.
9. For a discussion of the ALl Proposal see infra notes 144-67 and accompanying text.
10. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 8, § 7.03, at 211.
11. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
12. See SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, supra note 1, at § 8.01 (derivative actions have "long been stigmatized as
the refuge of strike suit artists specializing in corporate extortion"); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d at 779, 787 (3d
Cir. 1982) ("strike suits" are in essence those filed by persons without regard to the accuracy of the charges so as
to coerce settlement money from corporate management, which may prefer settling, to make the potential prob-
lems go away).
13. 908 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
14. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1344.
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tion. '5 While the reasoning and holding of the Seventh Circuit was summarily re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Kamen, 6 that rationale is still available to a state
legislature and/or court wishing to reshape its demand requirement. Therefore, a
background and analysis of both Kamen decisions is also given. 7 It will also be
shown that the Supreme Court's holding in Kamen would not prevent a state from
adopting a mandatory demand requirement.I"
II. BACKGROUND AND LAW
A. Historical Background
The derivative suit is of longstanding tradition in jurisprudence, dating from
the early nineteenth century in England and the latter half of that century in the
United States.' 9 The action is equitable in nature and origin,20 and is "in essence
nothing more than a suit by a beneficiary [the shareholder] of a fiduciary . . . as
such."2" On the one hand, the equitable ancestry of the action was reflected in a
similar construction of the derivative action's requirements, such as particular at-
tention to the facts of each case and the employment of a court's sound discretion in
making determinations of whether the requirements were met.22 However, con-
cerns of corporate self-governance, allowing corporate disputes to be settled
within the corporate structure to the extent possible, guarding against the prolifer-
ation of strike suits, and "avoiding unnecessary judicial involvement in the internal
affairs of business organizations"2" have also been given considerable weight by
courts. A court could thus require a more stringent showing ofjudicial standing by
the derivative plaintiff, and characterize the action as one requesting an "extraor-
dinary remedy."24 The court could also profess a reluctance to hear matters which,
as viewed by the corporation's board, could be more properly handled in the cor-
porate boardroom than in the judicial courtroom.2"
The requirement that a demand be made on a corporation prior to bringing a
derivative action was articulated in the early case of Hawes v. Oakland.2" The
plaintiff in Hawes was a stockholder in a waterworks company which apparently
supplied free water to the City of Oakland in emergency situations, which the
plaintiff claimed reduced the value of the stock.27 The complaint was filed five
15. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., Il1 S. Ct. 1711, 1722-23 (1991).
16. Id. at 1720-23.
17. See infra notes 184-200, 201-22, 243-52 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
19. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, supra note 1, at § 8.01.
20. Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F Supp. 491,494 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
21. Goldstein v. Grossbeck, 142 F2d 422,425 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
22. Cohen, 44 F. Supp. at 494; Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180, 188 (N.Y. 1975) (whether demand re-
quirement must be met is within sound discretion of first court to which the issue is presented).
23.7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT AND ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1831, at
119 (8th ed. 1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE].
24. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, supra note 1, at § 8.01.
25. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979).
26. 104 U.S. 450(1881).
27. Id. at 450-51.
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days after the plaintiff had complained in writing to the company's board and re-
quested that the company "desist" from supplying the free water.28 The Court
stated that while a stockholder/plaintiff must allege actionable wrongdoing on the
corporation's part as a foundation of the complaint, the stockholder must initially
"show to the satisfaction of the court that he has exhausted all the means within his
reach to obtain, within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances, or
action in conformity to his wishes."29 The Court required that a bona fide effort be
made "to induce remedial action" by the corporate management, or by the stock-
holders, or show why such could not be accomplished or should not be required.30
The Court later held that such a demand could be excused if the effort would be
futile, 3 and codified this holding in former Equity Rule 27 (1912).32 However, in
Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Refining Co. , the Court also held that the grounds for
foregoing with the demand on the corporation must be stated in the complaint.
34
B. More to the Present
5
The demand requirement in federal-based actions is found in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.1, which was adopted in 1966 and made no substantive change
to the requirement as expressed in earlier rules. 3' The RMBCA § 7.40, prior to
amendment in 1989, required that demand be made on the board of directors or
reason(s) alleged for not so doing. The former Model Business Corporation Act
(MBCA) did not contain a demand requirement in its derivative section, 37 pre-
sumably leaving that matter to be addressed by other state law.38 Whether the cor-
porate statutes are based on the RMBCA, MBCA, or a variation of either, all
28. Id. at 451,461.
29. Id. at 460-61.
30. Id. at 461.
31. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susquehana R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 435,452 (1909).
32. See Daniel R. Fischel, Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative
Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 168, 171 n.23 (1976).
33. 235 U.S. 635 (1915).
34. Id. at 640-41.
35. It is noted that this comment is not intended as an extensive presentation of all the various nuances of the
demand requirement, but focuses on the abolition of the futility exception to that requirement, and the policy
considerations which accompany this proposed abolition. It is necessary to present material on the current status
of demand-excused litigation and related topics, and information follows to that end. For more information on the
demand requirement, see, e.g., Fischel, supr note 32; Mark D. Seidelson, Note, Variations on the Theme of
Shareholder Derivative Actions: Changing the Tune of Rule 23.1 and the Beat of the Delaware Two-Step, 57 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 363 (1988); Deborah A. DeMott, Demand in Derivative Actions: Problems of Interpretation and
Function, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 461 (1986); Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a
Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746 (1960).
36. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 73, at 488 (4th ed. 1983) ("pre-1966 decisions
remain completely authoritative") [hereinafter WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs]. But see Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1716
("although Rule 23.1 clearly contemplates both the demand requirement and the possibility that demand may be
excused, it does not create a demand requirement of any particular dimension. On its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only
to the adequacy of the shareholder representative's pleadings."). Therefore, under this latest holding of the Court,
while Rule 23.1 may "contain" a demand requirement, the rule is not the source of it. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1716.
37. See supra note 2; MODEL BUsINESS CORP. ACT § 49 (1978) [hereinafter MBCA].
38. E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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states require that demand be made on the board of directors, absent futility or ex-
cuse.
3 9
Rule 23. 1 allows for the necessity of demand on the shareholders of the corpo-
ration by the complainant, if required by state law.4 The states take varying paths
as to whether this demand is required, "although the growing trend appears to re-
ject a shareholder demand requirement."4 The reasons for having a shareholder
demand are similar to that of demand on directors, including enhancing the possi-
bility that the shareholders themselves might take any needed remedial measures
at a shareholders meeting, or decide no action was warranted after all.' Among
the jurisdictions requiring shareholder demand, several require that the share-
holders "ratify," or approve, the action challenged by the derivative plaintiff, un-
less the shareholders are powerless to do so.1
3
Demand on a board of directors may be excused under the "futility" exception
for a variety of reasons. Justifications for excusal may include the antagonism or
hostility of the directors toward the complaint, the self-interest of the directors in
the action complained of, that the board is under the influence of a controlling
shareholder named as the alleged wrongdoer, and that the board approved the
transaction complained of, or denies that it occurred.' These reasons may not,
however, be deemed sufficient to excuse demand in a given case, especially if the
plaintiff failed to allege ajustification for futility with "particularity," i.e., with the
basis for excuse appearing "in the pleading itself."45 If the demand is made and
refused, that refusal may be viewed as dispositive by a court as an extension of the
"business judgment" rule.4" Judicial deference may be given to that rule even if no
demand is made due to futility if an "independent" or "special litigation commit-
39. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRrs, supra note 36, at 488.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
41. WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 23, § 1832, at 123-24. Mississippi, whose Business
Corporation Act is based on the RMBCA, does not require shareholder demand. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-
7.40(b) (1989). Likewise, neither (former) RMBCA § 7.40 nor the current amended version § 7.42, require
shareholder demand. RMBCA § 7.42 (amended 1989). The Official Comment to § 7.42 notes that demand is to
be made on the "corporation," which it says will usually be the board of directors, but could be an officer of the
corporation. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1245; see also DeMott, supra note 35, at 462,474-
84.
42. WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 23, § 1832, at 121-22.
43. Id. at 124; see, e.g., RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1083 (6th ed.
1987) (where derivative action was based on Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 no shareholder
demand was required, since shareholders "could not ratify a violation of the Federal Securities laws," (citing
Dopp v. American Elec. Lab., Inc., 55 ER.D. 151, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1972))). The practitioner involved in a de-
rivative action must be aware, of course, of the particular shareholder demand requirements, if any, of the state
in which the action may be brought. This comment, however, is primarily concerned with demand on the direc-
tors or corporation.
44. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS § 365, at 1069 (3d ed. 1983).
45. In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257,263 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973)
(plaintiff cannot plead in general terms, hoping to later make a case through discovery or otherwise).
46. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 44, at 1070. The business judgment rule "is a presumption that in mak-
ing a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. 1971)).
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tee" of the board recommends that the suit is not in the corporation's best inter-
ests. 47
1. Treatment of the Futility Exception in Federal Courts
Derivative actions are brought in federal courts either on the basis of federal
substantive law or diversity of citizenship. Federal courts vary in their determina-
tions regarding the futility exception, as between circuits, on the basis of whether
the underlying law applied is federal or state (or some of both)," and due to differ-
ing interpretations given to the reasons for futility named above.49
One situation in which the futility exception has been granted involves cases in
which either a significant number of or a majority of the board either acquiesced
in the conduct complained of, or were allegedly under the influence of controlling
shareholders who were the named defendants. "The question is whether, given the
composition and structure of the board, it would be futile to expect it to respond to
the shareholder's concerns."°5 In Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp. ,51 the
Fifth Circuit held that because the controlling shareholders were named defend-
ants, and those shareholders picked the board which would have entertained any
demand request made, the futility of the demand was presumed.52 The First Cir-
cuit recently excused demand in a case in which the two defendants constituted the
entire board of directors of a small corporation, were the majority shareholders of
both that corporation and others named as defendants, and who personally prof-
ited from the wrongdoing charged ." In Lewis v. Curtis, 4 the Third Circuit held
that since the complaint alleged that all the directors approved of and took part in
the challenged activity, and that activity was an interested transaction for the di-
rectors, demand would be excused .5 "When a complaint alleges. . . that all the
directors participated in and approved of a self-interested transaction, and sets
47. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 44, at 1070, 1074. The "independent" committee, which may be aided
by "independent" counsel or other experts, may investigate the alleged wrongdoing, and if done with indepen-
dence in fact and in good faith, its recommendation may receive deference from the court through the business
judgment rule. Id. at 1074. The operation and reach of such committees goes beyond the scope of this comment,
but general information is presented along with cases pertinent to the futility exception.
48. See, e.g., Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1341-42; Johnson v. Hui, 752 F. Supp. 909, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
50. WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 23, at 115.
51. 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980).
52. Clark, 625 F.2d at 53 (citing Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923, 924-25 (S. D.N.Y. 1975) (demand excused
where 44% of outstanding shares were owned by three defendants); In re Penn Cent. Secs. Litig., 367 F Supp.
1158, 1164-65 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (80 % of shares owned by one defendant, demand excused)).
53. Marquis Theatre Corp. v. Condado Mini Cinema, 846 F.2d 86, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that it
reached the same conclusion in a case in which half of a corporation's board were interested parties (citing Unter-
meyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978))).
54. 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
55. Curtis, 671 F.2d at 787.
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forth in detail facts showing [the self-interest of the directors], any demand must
be presumed futile."' 6
Contrary to the Lomas & Nettleton decision, the Second Circuit held that de-
mand was not excused although one defendant was president and chairman of the
board of the corporation in question, had chosen all but one of the directors, and
owned 71 % of the company's voting shares.57 The court stated that "[tihe com-
plaint must further indicate that the majority shareholder controls the votes of the
board."sa Ownership of the majority of the corporation's shares, and, apparently,
choosing most all of the board's directors, did not "automatically" make demand
futile. 9 This circuit had already held in Lewis v. Graves6" that mere acquiescence
and approval by the board of the challenged action, without specific allegations of
bias or self-dealing by a majority of that board, was not sufficient to establish de-
mand futility.61 To most courts, the mere naming of the directors of the derivative
corporation as defendants also does not excuse demand solely on the premise that
the directors "would have to decide whether to sue themselves. "62 Absent bias such
as where the directors have wrongly taken part in a self-interested transaction or
one "completely undirected to a corporate purpose,"63 which would make demand
futile, the suit should usually be dismissed.64
The cases involving the futility exception illustrate that the plaintiff must make
specific allegations having some basis other than mere accusation in order to have
demand excused. The decisions may vary within or among circuits on grounds of
factual differences, with the cases stating many of the same presumptions and re-
quirements, such as that of self-interested transactions and the need for particular-
56. Id. (citing Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 968 (3d Cir. 1976)) (demand required "where the allegations
do not make charges against a majority of a Board"); see also deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223,
1228 (10th Cir. 1970) (in accord with district court's conclusion that demand was excused in merger context, in
which survivor corporation was so dominated by defendants that demand would have been futile).
57. Kaster v. Modification Sys., Inc., 731 F.2d 1014, 1015-16, 1019 (2d Cir. 1984).
58. Id. at 1019.
59. Id. at 1020. However, the court also held that the district court erred in not allowing the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint. Id. at 1015.
60. 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
61. Id. at 248 (while stating that demand is presumptively futile if the directors are "antagonistic, adversely
interested, or involved in the transactions attacked").
62. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F2d 928,943 (3d. Cir. 1982), vacated, 465 U.S. 1001 (1984);
accord, Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Kaufman v. Safeguard Scientifics, Inc.,
587 F. Supp. 486,489 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
63. Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting In re Kauffman Mut.
Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1973)); see also Gaubert v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 863 F.2d
59, 65, 67-68, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (mere acquiescence of board did not excuse demand even though the savings
and loan association had been placed in federal receivership; plaintiff must make particularized showing that
board members would not give impartial hearing to his claim for demand to be futile); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1973) ("When a corporation is in receivership, any demand to bring suit in its behalf must
be made upon the receiver rather than the directors," general allegation of demand futility was "merely a vague,
conclusory statement.").
64. Greenspun, 634 F.2d at 1210.
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ized allegations.6" However, in Smith v. Gordon,66 the court characterized the
circuit "majority position" as the approach taken in cases such as In re Kauffman
Mutual Fund Actions,67 requiring the specificities of bias or self-dealing.6" The
"minority position" would be represented by the Fifth Circuit's Clark v. Lomas &
Nettleton Financial Corp. 69 and the Tenth Circuit case of deHaas v. Empire Petro-
leum Co. 7oholding for a broader possibility of demand excusal.71 While the issue
of demand futility can be a matter of factual dispute, the issue is one for the trial
court to decide in its "sound discretion."72 That decision is reviewed by the appeals
court on an abuse of discretion standard.73
Another issue in cases brought in a federal venue is the application of state and
federal law to the demand requirement and futility exception. The issue involves a
question of which law, state or federal, is to apply- first, as to whether demand
should be required or excused, and also whether the plaintiffs complaint has met
the particularity requirement of Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.74 The answer regarding the particularity requirement would seem settled, in
that whether a complaint met the requirements of a federal rule of procedure
would be decided by federal law.7" However, whether the source of the demand
requirement is from state or federal law and whether the requirements for pleading
demand or futility are to be considered under state or federal law are matters
which have attracted differing views." "Many federal courts have apparently as-
sumed that the federal procedural rule [23.1] establishes both the pleading guide-
lines as well as the substantive contours of the underlying demand requirement.""
65. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hui, 752 F. Supp. 909,912-13 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (alleging that directors would have
to sue themselves is insufficient to excuse demand; however, held futile where six of the eight directors were ac-
cused of "profiting from insider trading"); Burt on Behalf of McDonnell Douglas v. Danforth, 742 F. Supp. 1043,
1047-48 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (merely naming directors as defendants fails to excuse demand; however, where plain-
tiff alleges that "entire board has been engaged in a conspiracy to violate federal laws," and board "would have to
sue itself for engaging in illegal activity," the demand should be excused); First Am. Bank & Trust by Levitt v.
Frogel, 726 F. Supp. 1292, 1298 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (plaintiff alleged directors' and officers' liability insurance
policy prohibited board from instituting suit on corporation's behalf against any director or officer; inside direc-
tors had 40% of voting power; demand held futile).
66. 668 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Va. 1987).
67. 479 F.2d 257,265 (1st Cir. 1973); see also Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245,248-49 (2d Cir. 1983); Green-
spun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1980).
68. Smith, 668 F Supp. at 522-23; see also In re Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 264-65 (mere participation or ap-
proval by directors not enough to excuse demand, otherwise, FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 would be rendered "virtually
meaningless").
69. 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52, 56.
72. deHaas, 435 F.2d at 1228.
73. Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1536 (11 th Cir. 1990) (so reviewing denial of motion to dismiss
under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1); Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1170 (7th Cir. 1989) (if no
error of law was made, review demand requirement under abuse of discretion standard).
74. In re Bank Am. Secs. Litig., 636 F. Supp. 419, 421 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
75. Id. at 421 (federal law should determine whether sufficient particularity has been shown).
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. Gaubert, 863 F.2d at 63 (citing Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1208-10 (9th Cir.
1980); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1973)).
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Some courts, however, have considered whether "state corporate law must pro-
vide the source of" the substantive requirement, rather than using Rule 23.1 for
that purpose.7" In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,79 the United States Supreme
Court did not reach this issue in holding that Rule 23.1 did not apply to an action
brought under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,80 meaning
no demand was required.81 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated that Rule
23.1 did not require a demand, but only that the complaint meet the particularity
requirement as to whether a demand had been made or not.82 He added that "the
Rule concerns itself solely with the adequacy of the pleadings; it creates no sub-
stantive rights."83
The Supreme Court's holding in Kamen84 reflects the view expressed by Justice
Stevens in Daily Income." In Kamen, the Court stated that Rule 23.1 does not
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."8 The Court also stated that the
function of the demand requirement was clearly a matter of "substance" rather
than "procedure,"87 and that Rule 23.1 does not itself "create" a demand require-
ment. 8 The Court in Kamen held that in a derivative action founded on federal
law, a court should apply the demand/futility doctrine of the state of incorpora-
tion, unless federal law clearly indicated otherwise, or the application of such state
law would be "inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal statute.
8 9
In the actual decision of a given case, the federal/state choice-of-law matter
may amount only to "a distinction without a difference."9" Under a "federal" stand-
ard or state substantive law, the requirement of a demand or provision for excuse
may be basically the same, meaning the result in a given case would be the same
under either application. 1
78. Id. at 63-64 (citations omitted).
79. 464 U.S. 523 (1984).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1982).
81. Daily Income, 464 U.S. at 542.
82. Id. at 543 (Stevens, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 543-44 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also stated that the demand requirement itself,
rather than Rule 23.1, being "designed to improve corporate governance," was "one of substantive law." Id. at
544 n.2. But see In re Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 263 (quoting Barlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 109 N.E. 452,
456 (Mass. 1915)) ("[Rule 23.1] is not a technical rule of pleading, but one of substantive right.").
84. 111S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
85. 464 U.S. at 542-43 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. 111 S. Ct. at 1716 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1717-18, 1722.
90. Smith v. Gordon, 668 F. Supp. 520, 522 (E.D. Va. 1987).
91. Gaubert, 863 F.2d at 64 (court found "no meaningful differences between the prevailing 'federal' stand-
ard" and that of Texas law); Smith, 668 F. Supp. at 522 ("For all practical purposes, there is no difference be-
tween the demand requirements of federal and Virginia law"); In re BankAmerica, 636 F Supp. at 421 (state law
applied, though court noted parenthetically that the decision of the case would not differ under federal analysis).
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2. State Law Under the Delaware Approach
The evaluation of demand futility is interrelated with both the weight given to
the business judgment rule,92 and the status of the corporation's board, in terms of
having "interested" directors or "disinterested" directors to transactions allegedly
involving self-dealing or conflicts of interest.9 3 Also crucial to this area are the use
and role of special litigation committees in the process of handling either a de-
mand for action from a shareholder, or the latter's effort to establish sufficient ex-
cuse for not making such a demand.9" The significance which is given to the
business judgment rule, and/or the recommendation of a board's special litigation
committee, and the burden on the plaintiff in attempting to establish demand futil-
ity have been heavily litigated and the subject of much judicial review." S The Dela-
ware approach to these issues is presented due to the influence of Delaware
corporate law throughout the nation, and the high level of corporate activity
within that state.
96
The historic case of Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado97 set out a two-step process to
be followed in derivative actions in which a majority of the board was "interested"
in the transaction or wrong complained of: First, the court was to examine the in-
dependence and good faith of the special litigation committee appointed by the
board to make recommendations on the complaint, and the burden was on the cor-
poration to show reasonable investigation of the wrongful action alleged.98 If the
committee indeed lacked independence or did not show a reasonable basis for
findings made in good faith, then the action could not be dismissed on the basis of
the special litigation committee's recommendation. 99 If, however, independence
and a good faith, reasonable basis were shown, the court "may proceed, in its dis-
cretion,"' 0 to the second step: The court would determine whether the suit should
be dismissed, applying "its own independent business judgment," 11 amounting to
a review of the complaint on the merits.
InAronson v. Lewis"0 2 the Delaware Supreme Court answered a question that it
stated was left unanswered in Zapata: When would a demand be excused as futile
when a shareholder sought to bring a derivative suit.103 The court addressed the
question as being "inextricably bound" to issues of the business judgment rule,
92. See supra note 46; see also infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
94. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773-74 (Del. 1990).
95. See, e.g., Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1344.
96. Michael P. Dooley and E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law
and the Current ALl Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAW. 503 (1989) (noting that over half of the Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in Delaware).
97. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
98.Id. at 788.
99. Id. at 789.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
103. Id. at 807.
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which it defined as "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."" 4 As this presump-
tion can serve to protect a board from protracted inquiry by a court into the valid-
ity of that judgment, the court added that this protection could be claimed only by
"disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meets the tests of business judg-
ment," in terms of a lack of self-dealing and personal profit from a transaction,
other than one shared by the corporation or stockholders in a general sense. 0 5 If a
majority of the board was not disinterested, and thus unable to approve the ques-
tioned transaction, then the business judgment rule was inapplicable. The court
stated the standard to be followed as: "whether, under the particularized facts al-
leged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and in-
dependent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment. 10 6 Mere approval by directors of the challenged
transaction, standing alone, would not suffice to show reasonable doubt, nor
would a contention that the directors would have to sue themselves in order to take
the proper action. 107 In a later case the court declined to formulate criteria for what
would constitute "reasonable doubt," preferring a fact-based, case-by-case analy-
sis at the trial court level. 108
If the plaintiff falls short of meeting this burden through sufficiently particular-
ized allegations, then demand is not excused and must be made on the directors.
Once the demand is required, the board may choose to investigate the complaint
itself or appoint a special litigation committee ("SLC") for that purpose. The con-
clusion of the SLC in that instance is not to be reviewed judicially. "Judicial review
of the merits of a special litigation committee's decision to refuse a demand is lim-
ited to those cases where demand upon the board of directors is excused and the
board has decided to retain control of litigation through the use of an independent
special litigation committee." 9 Therefore, the only issues in the Delaware de-
mand-required context are the reasonableness of the SLC's investigation and its
good faith. "By electing to make a demand, a shareholder/plaintiff tacitly con-
cedes the independence of a majority of the board to respond.""' Therefore, while
not going as far as the highly deferential approach of New York inAuerback v. Ben-
104. Id. at 812.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 814.
107. Id. at 817-18 (the latter being the so-called "bootstrap" argument).
108. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988).
109. Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 778.
110. Id. at 777; see also Donald E. Pease, Aronson v. Lewis: When Demand is Excused and Delaware's Business
Judgment Rule, 9 DEL. J. Cop. L. 39 (1984); Dooley & Veasey, supra note 96, at 504-12.
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nett,111 the weight given by the Delaware court to the determinations of an SLC is
considerable, particularly if the plaintiff cannot show that the refusal was "wrong-
ful.,, 112
III. ABOLITION OF THE FUTILITY EXCEPTION
A. The Amended RMBCA
Subchapter D, an amendment to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
was adopted in December of 1989 by the Committee on Corporate Laws ("the
Committee") of the American Bar Association Section of Business Law. 13 The
amendment replaces section 7.40 of the RMBCA, and contains substantive
changes for both the demand requirement issue'14 and the stay of proceedings in
derivative suits."11 The amendment also provides for dismissal of such actions,116
a matter not previously addressed by the RMBCA. 17
1. The Demand Requirement of Amended RMBCA Section 7.42
This section states that written demand on a corporation will be a prerequisite
in all derivative actions; there is no provision for a showing of excuse or futility. 118
According to the Official Comment, this mandatory demand and the ninety-day
waiting period between its submission and the commencement of a suit will give
the directors, independent or not, the chance to reexamine the allegedly wrongful
action and take any corrective action necessary.119 In addition, the delay and ex-
pense spent litigating whether demand is excused or required is eliminated. The
ninety-day period is proposed as a reasonable wait, and one which can be short-
ened on a showing of threat of irreparable injury to the corporation.12 ° The Com-
mittee characterized the granting of demand excusal as a rarity anyway, and stated
111. 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979). The approach of Auerbach is apparently alive and well in New York,
see, e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y. 1990) (business judg-
ment rule of Auerbach applied as standard of judicial review to actions of condominium governing bbard; applied
by analogy); Rosen v. Bernard, 485 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (in a derivative setting, the inde-
pendence of the SLC and its methods of investigation, being possibly dispositive, warrant granting a limited
hearing solely for those issues).
112. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 96, at 509 (wrongful refusal must be pleaded with same particularity as
is required for demand excusal).
113. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1241 (the amendment is reprinted in full along with
the Committee's Official Comment).
114. Id. at 1244§7.42.
115. Id. at 1246§7.43.
116.Id. at § 7.44.
117. Id. at 1241.
118. Id. at 1244. Section 7.42 reads in full:
No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until:
(1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and
(2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been noti-
fied that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation
would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90 day period.
RMBCA § 7.42.
119. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1244.
120. Id. at 1244-45.
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that "[m]any plaintiffs' counsel as a matter of practice make a demand in all cases
rather than litigate the issue whether demand is excused."121
While section 7.42 is a marked departure from former section 7.40(b), which
by implication allowed a futility exception to making demand,122 the new section
also allows the derivative shareholder to still bring the action even if demand is
refused. 123 If the corporation refuses the demand or does not respond, the plaintiff
can commence a derivative action at the end of the ninety-day period. However, if
the corporation accepted the demand and filed suit, or after the shareholder
brought suit decided to assume control, the shareholder's involvement as a princi-
pal to the litigation ends, absent a showing that the company would not sufficiently
handle the matter.124 If the corporation does not assume control, but instead be-
gins an "inquiry" into the allegations, a stay of proceedings can be obtained from
the court, before or after the action has commenced. 125
It should be noted that the demand under section 7.42 is to be made on "the cor-
poration" rather than the directors or shareholders. Although the directors or their
designee are usually the appropriate body to receive and review a demand, the
amendment allows for the possibility that an officer of the corporation would be
the proper person to examine the demand request.'26
2. Dismissal of Derivative Actions - Amended RMBCA Section 7.44
Neither the prior RMBCA nor the MBCA specifically provided for the dis-
missal of derivative actions in cases where demand was properly refused, and did
not address the effect of a determination by an independent special litigation com-
mittee (SLC) to move for dismissal of such suits '27 The amended RMBCA pro-
vides for dismissal "if there is a proper determination that the maintenance of the
proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation."'128 Such a determination
can be made in response to the demand, prior to suit, or after the suit begins on the
basis of the complaint's allegations."12 Section 7.44 provides several mechanisms
121. Id. at 1244; see also Dooley & Veasey, supra note 96, at 509.
122. The relevant portion of section 7.40(b) of the former RMBCA read as follows:
(b) A complaint in a proceeding brought in the right of a corporation must be verified and allege with
particularity the demand made, if any, to obtain action by the board of directors and either that the de-
mand was refused or ignored or why he did not make the demand.
RMBCA § 7.40(b) (1984).
123. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, § 7.42, at 1244.
124. Id. at 1245-46. The irreparable injury exception to the ninety-day period would require a showing similar
to that required for the granting of a preliminary injunction. Time of expiration of any applicable statute of limita-
tions might also be grounds for reducing the ninety days. Only a single demand is necessary to put the board on
notice for the alleged need for corrective measures, and the person making the demand and the shareholder
bringing the suit do not necessarily have to be the same. Id.
125. Id. at 1246. "If the corporation commences an inquiry into the allegations made in the demand or com-
plaint, the court may stay any derivative proceeding for such a period as the court deems appropriate." Id. at §
7.43 ("Stay of Proceedings").
126. Id. at 1245.
127. Id. at 1247-48; see also former RMBCA § 7.40 (1984); MBCA § 49.
128. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1248.
129. Id.
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through which the inquiry and determination can be made, including by a majority
of independent directors if such constitutes a quorum, or a majority of an SLC
composed of at least two independent directors, quorum or not, or by one or more
court-appointed independent persons selected to conduct the inquiry.130
The Official Comment states that the term "independent" director necessarily
includes "disinterested," in that the director should have "no interest" in the ques-
tioned transaction. 131 However, the category is not limited to "outside" directors
not employed by the corporation. 132 In addition, the amendment expressly rejects
case holdings of the "minority" view 133 which would allow the "interest" of a direc-
tor to be shown on the basis of naming directors as defendants of the derivative
action, or due to mere "approval" of the act in question, if done without personal
benefit to that director, or by a showing that a director was elected by others
named as defendants in the suit. 
134
130. Id. at 1246-47; RMBCA § 7.44 reads in full:
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if one of the
groups specified in subsections (b) or (f) has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable in-
quiry upon which its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the
best interests of the corporation. (b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (f), the determina-
tion in subsection (a) shall be made by:
(1) a majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors if the inde-
pendent directors constitute a quorum; or
(2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by ma-
jority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether or not such
independent directors constitute a quorum.
(c) None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be considered not independent for purposes of
this section:
(1) the nomination or election of a director by persons who are defendants in the derivative proceed-
ing or against whom action is demanded;
(2) the naming of the director as a defendant in the derivative proceeding or as a person against whom
action is demanded; or
(3) the approval by the director of the act being challenged in the derivative proceeding or demand if
the act resulted in no personal benefit to the director.
(d) Ifa derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination has been made rejecting a demand by a
shareholder, the complaint shall allege with particularity facts establishing either (1) that a majority of the
board of directors did not consist of independent directors at the time the determination was made or (2)
that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been met.
(e) If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of independent directors at the time the determi-
nation is made, the corporation shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of subsection (a)
have been met. If a majority of the board of directors consists of independent directors at the time the
determination is made, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of subsection
(a) have not been met.
(f) The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent persons upon motion by the corporation to
make a determination whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interests of the
corporation. In such case, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) have not been met.
RMBCA § 7.44 (amended 1989).
131. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1248 (the "no interest" means a lack of personal benefit
from the challenged transaction, other than "one which devolves upon the corporation or the shareholders gener-
ally").
132. Id.
133. See supra text and cases accompanying notes 50-56.
134. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, § 7.44(c)(l)-(3), at 1247. Subsection (f) of section 7.44
provides for a court-appointed independent panel which could conduct the inquiry, upon the motion of the corpo-
ration. This provision could be useful to a corporation which does not have any independent directors, or does
not wish to appoint new directors merely for the purpose of "creating" disinterested slots. Id. at 1247, 1249.
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The term "inquiry" is used in section 7.44(a), rather than "investigation," to
provide a more flexible framework for the corporation's consideration of the de-
mand and/or suit. The group conducting the inquiry may need only make a lim-
ited examination of certain complaints, while a more intensive effort may be
required regarding others, depending on the facts and allegations.135 The focus is
to be on the "good faith" in which both the inquiry and determination were made,
and "the inquiry intended by this phrase goes to the spirit and sincerity with which
the investigation was conducted, rather than the reasonableness of its procedures
or basis for conclusions."136
If a demand is rejected prior to suit being brought, the plaintiff must then estab-
lish by alleging particular facts that either the majority of the board was not inde-
pendent at the time of the section 7.44(a) "determination," or that the subsection's
requirements have not been met.137 The burden of proof regarding those require-
ments is on the plaintiff in the case of an independent board majority, and on the
corporation if the majority is not independent -in each instance, "independence"
relates to the time of the determination, not the alleged wrongful transaction.
1 38
The Committee states that these subsections as to board independence and the re-
sultant burden of proof follow the first prong of the Aronson test.139 Significantly,
the amendment does not allow for the second inquiry of Aronson, that of whether
the transaction was the product of a "valid exercise of business judgment. 140 "The
Committee believes the only appropriate concern in the context of derivative liti-
gation is whether the board considering the demand has a disabling conflict." 4'
The word "reasonable" in section 7.44(a) modifies "inquiry," not the ultimate de-
termination of that inquiry, and this section does not authorize courts to review
whether the determination itself was reasonable.142
The amended RMBCA as set out above represents a definite change from the
present "demand excused-demand refused" dichotomy.1 3 The plaintiff must al-
ways make demand under this proposal, though a derivative action can theoreti-
cally still be brought on refusal, albeit through the strictures of judicial deference
to the corporation's refusal, absent an "interested" majority or a lack of good faith.
135. Id. at 1246, 1249-50.
136. Id. at 1250 (Official Comment) (quoting Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F Supp. 795, 800
(E.D. Va. 1982)).
137. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, § 7.44(d), at 1247, 1251 ("Itlhe board's response to the
shareholder's demand is presumptively protected by the traditional business judgment rule .... The plaintiff
must allege with particularity a lack of good faith, care, independence or disinterestedness by the directors in
responding to the demand.") Id. at 1251.
138. Id. at 1247, 1250 (section 7.44(e)).
139. Id. at 1251; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); see supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
140. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1247; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814; see also supra note 94.
141. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1252 (amended RMBCA) (citing Starrels v. First Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 870 F2d 1168, 1172-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)).
142. Id.
143. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 96, at 507-09.
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B. ALI Proposal
The American Law Institute has also put forth proposals regarding the demand
requirement and dismissal of derivative proceedings. These proposals are part of
the ALI's corporate governance project, and are referred to herein as "the ALI pro-
posal."
1. The Demand Requirement of the ALI Proposal
Consistent with the amended RMBCA in this respect, the ALl proposal re-
quires a written demand in all cases, unless the plaintiff has made a satisfactory
showing that irreparable injury would result to the corporation.'" This demand is
to be presented specifically to the board of directors, rather than the "corporation"
as under section 7.42 of the amended RMBCA. The ALI demand rule, section
7.03, also states that demand on shareholders should not be required. 14
The comment to section 7.03 states that a universal demand rule should be
adopted for three main reasons. First, a mandatory demand rule "would eliminate
much of the collateral litigation that ... slows the pace and increases the cost of
litigation."1 Foregoing with any dispute over demand futility would allow the
merit of the action, if any, to be reached sooner and more efficiently. 47 Second,
the cost to the plaintiff in making the demand is minimal, and the demand provides
the board an opportunity to take corrective action, 1" which may serve as "a form
of alternative dispute resolution." 49 Third, the ALl proposal rejects the deferen-
tial standard of judicial review employed by Delaware in demand-required situa-
tions.15 ' This proposal provides instead for a "variable standard of judicial
scrutiny,"'' which can extend to the merits of the action, rather than the more def-
erential review standard of section 7.44 of the amended RMBCA.' 52 Therefore,
although the futility exception is eliminated, the plaintiff does not necessarily face
144. The ALl demand rule reads as follows:
[Section] 7.03 Exhaustion of Intracorporate Remedies: the Demand Rule (a) Before commencing a de-
rivative action, a holder. . . should make a written demand upon the board of directors of the corpora-
tion, requesting it to prosecute the action or take suitable corrective action, unless demand is excused
under [§1 7.03(b). The demand should give notice to the board with reasonable specificity of the essen-
tial facts relied upon by the holder to support the allegations made therein.
(b) Demand on the board should be excused only when the plaintiff makes a specific showing that irrepa-
rable injury to the corporation would otherwise result. A plaintiff who is excused from making demand
prior to the filing of the action should make demand on the board as provided in [§J 7.03(a) promptly
thereafter.
(c) Demand on shareholders should not be required.
ALl, Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 8, at 211 (appendix). This section was approved by the ALl membership at its
1988 annual meeting. Id.
145. Id.
146. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, § 7.03 cmt., at 64 (1988).
147. Id. at 64-65.
148. Id. at 65.
149. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1983)).
150. ALI, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 65; see supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
151. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 119. The subject of judicial review is addressed infra notes 163-
67 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 135-36, 140-42 and accompanying text.
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a higher possibility of dismissal simply by making the required demand. The com-
ment of the ALI proposal states that continuance of the futility exception is not jus-
tified, even in a case in which the entire board is interested in the alleged
wrongdoing, because even in that situation the board is not "powerless to act." 3
The board could add new disinterested directors and appoint them to consider the
demand request,154 or could request the court to appoint an independent panel. 
15
"[Hience demand is still an appropriate starting point."156
2. Termination of Derivative Proceedings -The ALl Proposal
Section 7.08 of the ALI proposal addresses termination of derivative
actions.157 After a demand has been made, the board must first determine which
body will respond to the request: (1) the board itself, minus any interested direc-
tors, (2) a committee of disinterested directors, who may be appointed by an inter-
153. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 70-71.
154. Id.
155. Id. Provision for appointment of this panel is found at section 7.12. See ALT, Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note
8, at 63 (1989).
156. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 71.
157. Section 7.08 is as follows:
Termination of Actions Against Directors, Senior Executives, Controlling Persons, or Associates Based
on Action Taken by the Board or a Committee:
The court should dismiss a derivative action against a defendant who is a director. . . a senior executive
a person having control . . . over the corporation, or an associate . . . of any such person, if the
court determines in response to a motion made on behalf of the corporation by its board of directors, or a
properly delegated committee thereof, that the conditions set forth below in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d)
have been satisfied:
(a) The procedures specified in 1§] 7. 10 for the conduct of an internal evaluation of the action were
substantially complied with (either in response to a demand or following commencement of the
action), or any material departures therefrom were justified under the circumstances.
(b) Based on adequately supported determinations that the court deems to warrant reliance, the
board of directors or committee reasonably concluded (either in response to a demand or following
commencement of the action) that dismissal is in the best interest of the corporation.
(c) In evaluating whether the board's or committee's determinations warrant reliance and the rea-
sonableness of the board's or committee's conclusions, the court (i) may consider any relevant infor-
mation as to material developmelnts occurring subsequent to the time of demand or the board's or
committee's report; (ii) should independently review any conclusions of law upon which the determi-
nations of the board or the committee were based and any related legal matters; and (iii) where the
conduct of the defendant is alleged to have violated a duty set forth in Part IV (Duty of Care), but did
not involve a knowing and culpable violation of law by the defendant, should accept any determina-
tions and conclusions as to business matters, unless the plaintiff establishes that such determinations
and conclusions are so clearly unreasonable as to fall outside the bounds of the directors' discretion.
(d) Dismissal of the action would not permit a defendant, or an associate [§ 1.021 thereof, to retain
a significant improper benefit where:
(1) the defendant, either alone or collectively with others who are also found to have received a
significant improper benefit arising out of the same transaction, possesses control of the corpora-
tion; or
(2) such benefit was obtained:
(A) as the result of a knowing and material misrepresentation or omission or other fraudu-
lent act; or
(B) without authorization of such benefit by disinterested directors or authorization or rati-
fication by disinterested shareholders, in breach of § 5.02 ("Transactions with the Corpora-
tion") or § 5.04 ("Use of Corporate Information, Non-Public Information Concerning the
Corporation, or Corporate Property").
ALI, Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 8, at 212-14. This section was approved by the ALI membership at its 1988
annual meeting. Id. at 211.
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ested board, or (3) a panel appointed by the court upon the board's request, as per
section 7.12.158 The responding body then essentially has five alternatives from
which to choose in handling the demand: (1) it may reject the demand in whole or
in part, or (2) attempt to reach a settlement with the "potential defendants," or (3)
take corrective action in response to the allegations of the demand, and later re-
quest dismissal of any suit which may be filed, or (4) take over the suit itself, or (5)
permit the party making demand to file suit.159 Regarding the first three options, a
written report complying with section 7.1016' must be filed with the court. The
depth required of both the evaluation made for (or by) the board regarding the de-
mand, and the accompanying report will depend on the "gravity and plausibility"
of the demand's allegations. 161 The submission of this evaluation and report to the
court are prerequisites to a request by the board for a dismissal of a suit, under the
first three alternatives noted above. 1
62
Under section 7.08(c) thejudicial review given to a derivative action filed after
the demand will differ according to whether the action is based on a breach of the
defendant's duty of care, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.'63 In a duty of care case,
"the court should accept adequately supported findings [of the board or its evaluat-
ing body] as to business matters, even if the court itself [would not so conclude],
unless the findings are so clearly unreasonable as to fall outside the bounds of the
directors' discretion. 164 Therefore, in duty of care cases a court would give defer-
ential review to the judgment of a properly constituted board or committee, absent
compelling factors to the contrary. 16' This same deference, however, would not ex-
tend to duty of loyalty cases, which typically involve knowing violations of the law
or willful misconduct. The ALl proposal states that such cases merit "a closerjudi-
158. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 126.
159. Id.
160. Section 7.10 is as follows:
[Section] 7.10 Board Procedures for Termination of Derivative Actions. (a) In deciding whether an
action should be dismissed under [§ 7.08] the court should require that:
(1) The determinations and conclusions of the board or committee were based upon an evaluation
that was adequately informed under the circumstances, conducted by the board or a committee of two
or more directors, none of whose members was interested ... in the transaction or the alleged wrong
that is the subject of the demand or the action, and who as a group were capable of objective judgment
under the circumstances;
(2) The board or committee was assisted by a counsel of its choice . . . and such other agents as it
reasonably deemed necessary; and
(3) The board or committee prepared and submitted to the court a written report or other written sub-
mission meeting the standards specified in § 7.08(b).
ALI, Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 8, § 7.10, at 33-34. This is the version which was approved by the ALl mem-
bership at its 1989 annual meeting. See Block, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 6, at 502-03 n.220.
161. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, § 7.10 cmt., at 126-27; see also ALl, Tent. Draft No. 9, at 37, 42-
43.
162. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 126.
163. Id. at 120.
164. Id. at 122. The burden of showing this unreasonableness is on the plaintiff. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 9, supra
note 8, § 7.08(c), at 214.
165. A duty of care case could be based, for example, on an alleged lack of proper business judgment where a
major corporate investment proved to be unsuccessful. If the action was protected under the business judgment
rule, then the court would defer to the board or committee's judgment, if substantial compliance with section
7.10 procedures is shown. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 133.
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cial scrutiny," and that the deference, if any, given to the board should be less.166
How "close" this judicial review would be would apparently depend on the gravity
of the alleged wrongdoing, and whether a majority of the board was involved in
the claimed misconduct. 1
67
While a form of deferential review is part of the ALl proposal, this proposal
generally contemplates a higher amount of involvement by the judiciary. That in-
volvement could include review of the merits of a complaint to a greater degree
than that provided in the amended RMBCA, particularly in duty of loyalty cases.
C. The Kamen Cases
A recent federal case provided a third avenue in which a mandatory demand
rule was promulgated. In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. ,16 the Seventh
Circuit held that where a "claim for relief is based on federal substantive law," '69
and the demand requirement comes from "federal common law," 7 demand is re-
quired in all such cases,'17 ' and the futility exception to demand is abolished. 72 In a
unanimous decision authored by Justice Marshall, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, 73 holding that the demand/futility doctrine of the state of incor-
poration should be applied in this context, 74 and that the Court of Appeals had
erred in pronouncing a "uniform federal common law rule" in this situation. 17'The
facts of this case and the Seventh Circuit's opinion will be addressed first, and the
Supreme Court's decision will follow.
1. Background of the Case
The defendant in this case was an investment adviser for a money market fund
subject to federal regulation'76 under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940.177 The Act provides that such advisers have a fiduciary duty, requiring
honest dealing, regarding their compensation for services rendered. 78 Kamen,
the plaintiff and an investor in the fund, filed suit under section 36(b) of the Act
claiming that the defendant had charged excessive fees in its management of the
fund. 17' Kamen also claimed that the fund's solicitation of investor approval of the
166. Id. at 134-35.
167. Id. at 135 (disavowing a uniform standard of review for all duty of loyalty cases, and choosing not to word
the review in terms of the court's "independent business judgment," as was used in Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789).
168. 908 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990), revd, 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
169. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1342.
170. Id. at 1344.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1344, 1347.
173. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1723 (1991).
174. Id. at 1722-23 (meaning the state of incorporation of the corporation on whose behalf the derivative
action has been brought).
175. Id. at 1718, 1723.
176. Kamen, I IIS. Ct. at 1715; Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1339.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1982).
178. Id.
179. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1714-15; Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1339; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1982).
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adviser's fee structure was done through the use of a proxy statement which was
materially misleading,18 in violation of section 20(a) of the Investment Act. 181
The claim was eventually dismissed on class action grounds pertinent to the sec-
tion 36(b) claim,182 but the Seventh Circuit stated that the appeal presented ques-
tions in addition to the class action issue, only one of which is relevant here:
whether the section 20(a) claim, regarding the allegedly misleading proxy solicita-
tion, should be dismissed for failure to make a demand on the fund's directors, in
light of the requirements of Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.183
2. The Seventh Circuit's Holding and Rationale
In an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Rule 23.1
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as not creating a demand requirement, but
only governing the pleading requirements of a demand or why such was not
made." As the plaintiffs section 20(a) claim was one grounded in federal sub-
stantive law, the court stated that federal law should also govern the demand re-
quirement. 8 ' The court did consider the possibility of importing a state law
demand requirement, since the fund was a Maryland corporation, but instead used
"federal common law. 186 The court held that no federal precedent required the
court to adhere to an acknowledgement of the futility exception, and that none of
the usual grounds for excusal justified its continued existence. 87 The exception
had produced "gobs of litigation," and "sapped the potential role of the demand re-
quirement as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism."188 The possibilities of
interested directors who would not sue themselves should demand be made, a
board determined not to sue on a claim it would view as undesirable, or directors
whose judgment could be impaired by self-dealing or corporate intimidation were
all held to be inadequate reasons for allowing lack of demand due to futility.
189
"The time has come to do away with it. If demand is useful, then let the investor
make one; if indeed futile, the board's response will establish that soon
enough." 9 The court cited with approval the American Law Institute's effort to
do away with the futility exception,"' and also apparently concluded that a plain-
180. Kamen, I 11S. Ct. at 1715; Kamen, 908 F2d at 1340.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (1982).
182. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1340. The first district judge to hear the case dismissed the section 20(a) claim for
lack of a demand on the fund's board of directors; following this dismissal, the Seventh Circuit refused to grant a
mandamus order, and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Id. The second district judge to
hear the case (on the section 36(b) claim) then dismissed the action on the grounds that the plaintiff was an inade-
quate representative for a class action. id. at 1340.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1341.
185. Id. at 1342.
186. Id. The court ruled that Kamen's "suggestion" that Maryland law be applied "came too late," as this point
was not raised until in her reply brief. Id.
187. Id. at 1344-47.
188. Id. at 1344.
189. Id. at 1344-45.
190. Id. at 1344.
191. Id. (citing ALl, Proposal, Tent. Draft No. 8 (1988)).
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tiff could still proceed with a derivative action once demand was made and
refused. 192
Also significant in the Seventh Circuit's opinion was the rejection of Delaware's
"demand-refused"/"demand-excused" dichotomy as applied to the standard of ju-
dicial review, which Judge Easterbrook termed "[the] link between the making of a
demand and special deference to the board's decision not to sue."193 In a Delaware
demand-refused situation, the burden of Aronson v. Lewis.94 can be insurmounta-
ble for a plaintiff shareholder. "Except in extraordinary cases. . . tendering a de-
mand to the board puts the plaintiff out of court under Delaware law. No wonder
plaintiffs stoutly resist making demands."195 However, the court also stated that a
board's decision to refuse demand should be reviewed in light of state corporate
law,1" 6 which would seem to make its review distinction more apparent than real,
particularly since the business judgment standard the court would apply is that
"1197which "ordinarily applies to corporate decisions.
Abolition of the futility exception, according to the court, would bring any real
controversy, rather than hypothetical scenarios of such, to the forefront,198 and
would reduce the possibility of the demand requirement becoming "the center-
piece of the litigation. 1 99 Judge Easterbrook's opinion was foreshadowed by his
concurrence a year earlier in Starrels v. First National Bank of Chicago.200
192.Id. at 1345 (the plaintiff can argue wrongful refusal of demand, while "the board will stand on the business
judgment rule. The court will resolve the question on the merits rather than trying to treat it as a procedural hur-
dle.").
193. Id. at 1343 ("In Delaware, the Mother Court of corporate law, any shareholder who makes a demand is
deemed to concede that demand was required." (citing Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990);
Stotland v. GAF Corp., 469 A.2d 421 (Del. 1983))).
194. 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984); see also supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
195. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1343.
196. Id. at 1347.
197. Id.
If the directors run the show, then they must control litigation (versus other remedies) to the same extent
as they make [other] business decision[s]. .... Ifprinciples such as the 'business judgment rule' preserve
room for managers to err in making an operational decision, so too they preserve room to err in deciding
what remedies to pursue.
Id. at 1343.
198. Id. at 1344 ("futility is the usual sticking point" in the demand requirement context). "Courts predictably
have great difficulty in deciding who is right when, as is usual, it must decide such questions on the pleadings."
Id.
199. Id. at 1342. "Demand then becomes a threshold issue in every derivative suit, one that must be resolved in
advance of discovery and on the basis of a good deal of speculation about what the board might do." Id. at 1343-
44.
200. 870 F.2d 1168, 1172-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). The Starrels court, applying Dela-
ware law, held that the plaintiff's complaint did not state with particularity facts entitling her to excusal from de-
mand. Id. at 1172. Judge Easterbrook concurred in the opinion, and offered a lengthy critique of the demand
requirement and futility exception. That this was a "foreshadowing" of his opinion in Kamen is perhaps an under-
statement. Several sections of the two opinions read either word for word or with close similarity. Compare Star-
rels, 870 F.2d at 1173-74 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) with Kamen, 908 F2d at 1342-43.
[Vol. 12:197
WHOSE CORPORA TION IS IT, ANYWA Y?
3. The Supreme Court's decision in Kamen
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit's
decision to create a mandatory federal demand rule.2"1 The Court rejected both the
source and the content of the Seventh Circuit's demand rule, and held that proper
weight had not been given to state law regarding the demand requirement.22
The Court stated that Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not
the source of a demand requirement, although it also stated that the rule "clearly
contemplates both the demand requirement and the possibility that the demand
may be excused."2"3 The Court also stated that the demand doctrine was a matter
of substance rather than procedure, given its role in and effect on derivative
actions.20 4 As this was a suit under the Investment Company Act of 1940, a federal
statute, the paramount issue was identifying "the source and content of the sub-
stantive law that defines the demand requirement in such a suit. "205
While the applicable demand requirement in a suit based on federal law is to be
governed by federal law, the Court also stated that the content of that rule was not
necessarily to be "wholly the product of a federal court's own devising."206
Throughout Kamen, the Court relied heavily on its prior decision in Burks v.
Lasker.20 7 The question in Burks was whether independent directors could termi-
nate a nonfrivolous suit brought under the Investment Company Act. 208 The Burks
Court held that federal courts should apply state law to this question so long as that
law was not inconsistent with the policies of the federal statute.20 9 In Kamen the
Court used this principle in ruling on the universal demand requirement, holding
that a federal court which formulates "federal common law" to close the gap in a
federal statute, should use state law unless that conflicts with the policies of the
statute in question.210 In applying the Burks principle, the Court ruled that the Sev-
enth Circuit drew its universal demand rule from an inappropriate source-
namely, the ALl proposal. 21 The Court also stated that the universal demand rule
would increase the power of directors to dismiss corporate litigation, contrary to
the laws of many states which provide for a futility exception.21 2
The Seventh Circuit had attempted to separate the requirement for demand
from the deferential review standard given to directors in demand-required situa-
201. Kamen v. Kemper Fin, Serv., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1723 (1991).
202. Id. at 1720-23.
203. Id. at 1716.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1716-17.
206. Id. at 1717.
207. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
208. Id. at 484-86.
209. Id. at 485-86. "Congress has never indicated that the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be re-
placed simply because a plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute." Id. at 478.
210. Kamen, IllS. Ct. at 1722.
211. Id. at 1719-20.
212. Id. at 1720.
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tions under the law of Delaware and other states.213 The Supreme Court also re-
jected that attempt at "legal reform," stating that such a measure "would impose
upon federal courts the very duty 'to fashion an entire body of federal corporate
law' that Burks sought to avoid."214 The Court also noted the uncertainty which
could accompany such a federal review standard, particularly in cases in which
federal and state law claims were joined in the same derivative action.21 The
shareholder could be faced with the possibility of having demand required for fed-
eral law claims but not for state claims based on the same transaction.
16
The Seventh Circuit had touted the mandatory demand rule as a time-saver and
a measure of reducing "needless" litigation, as a required demand would eliminate
having to decide whether such demand would be futile.217 The Supreme Court,
however, held that such supposed "judicial economies" were simply overstated. A
universal demand rule would "merely shift the focus of the threshold litigation
from the question whether demand is excused to the question of whether the direc-
tors' decision to terminate the suit is entitled to deference under federal stand-
ards."218 The Court again held that such a displacement of state law would not
justify the alleged advantages of a mandatory demand requirement, in light of
Burks. 219
Finally, the Court rejected the possibility that a futility exception would be in-
consistent with the policies underlying the Investment Company Act. The imposi-
tion of mandatory demand in this context would actually give directors of these
investment companies "greater power to block shareholder derivative litigation
than these actors possess under the law of the State of incorporation." 22' The Court
concluded that there was no such policy in the federal statute which could justify
such a rule. Therefore, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision and re-
manded the case because the lower court had never considered whether the share-
holder's complaint sufficiently met the futility exception under Maryland state
213. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
214. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1721 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,480 (1979)).
215. Id.
216. Id. (noting that the board of directors would face a dilemma of their own in not knowing the level of defer-
ence they would be afforded given the differing review standards). A Second Circuit opinion which came after
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Kamen, but before the Supreme Court's review of Kamen is RCM Securities
Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 1991). In RCM, the Second Circuit considered and rejected the
attempted "reform" of the Seventh Circuit in Kamen. The Second Circuit used a Burks reasoning similar to the
Supreme Court's in applying state law to questions of the demand requirement in a derivative action based on
both federal securities law and Delaware corporate law. RCM, 928 F.2d at 1324, 1326-27.
If a state demand requirement were to apply to state claims and a federal demand requirement were to
apply to federal claims, a plaintiff bringing a derivative suit based on a single transaction might well be
subject to a demand requirement as to one legal theory while excused from making a demand as to another
legal theory.
id. at 1327.
217. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
218. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1721.
219. Id. at 1721-22.
220. Id. at 1722. The Court had stated that even given the principles of Burks it would be "constrained to dis-
place state law" if it had concluded that a futility exception would be inconsistent with policies of the Investment
Company Act. Id.
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law.22" ' Ironically, on remand the Seventh Circuit ruled that the directors' opposi-




A. The Proposals On the Table
The amended RMBCA and the ALl proposal both contain departures from cur-
rent law regarding the demand requirement and exceptions to demand. Most basi-
cally, each abolishes the futility exception and requires demand to be made to the
corporation in every instance. In addition, each addresses the type and standard of
judicial review to be employed in derivative actions.
1. The Amended RMBCA
The amended RMBCA, Subchapter D,223 could be viewed as the opening of
one door and the closing of another in derivative litigation. The plaintiff may still
bring suit even after a demand refusal, which is a broader approach than the defer-
ence given in Delaware to a board refusal of demand. 224 However, what section
7.42 of the amended RMBCA gives in this regard is taken away in section 7.44
concerning dismissal of the action: Unless the plaintiff can establish a claim within
the only two allowable "windows of opportunity," then the suit is dismissed. One
of the possible challenges to the demand refusal is the lack of an independent board
majority at the time of the refusal. The other is a claim that the board or commit-
tee's determination lacked good faith or reasonable inquiry.225 Since the court is
not to inquire as to the reasonableness of the actual determination made by the
board or committee regarding the suit, this deference may leave the "indepen-
dence" of the determining body as the only attainable ground on which the suit
could proceed.226 The review standard also explicitly rejects the Zapata reasoning
which would allow a court to apply its "own business judgment,"227 and the more
strict second prong ofAronson, which would examine the merits of the transaction
in light of the business judgment rule.228 While Aronson calls for a "reasonable
doubt" burden regarding the directors' independence,229 the amended RMBCA
provides for a "no doubts considered" standard as to the merits of a challenged
transaction. 230 The new subchapter also repudiates the so-called "minority view"
line of federal cases which have held that the naming of directors as defendants, or
221. Id. at 1723 n.10.
222. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 939 F.2d 458, 462 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 454 (1991).
223. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1241.
224. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
225. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1247.
226. Id. at 1250-52. Perhaps instead of two windows, there is but one window and a porthole.
227. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789; see supra text accompanying note 101.
228. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814; see supra text accompanying note 106.
229. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
230. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1252.
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controlling shareholders who control the board as defendants could suffice to meet
an excusal for demand.23 Regarding whether such persons are "independent" for
purposes of evaluating the demand, section 7.44 requires a higher showing of self-
interest or lack of independence. 232
Provision for a court-appointed, independent person or persons as the demand
evaluator does offer hope for objectivity and fairness. However, this mechanism is
available only on the motion of the corporation, not the plaintiff shareholder, al-
though the Official Comment adds that the court is free to appoint a special master
to consider the matter, subject to the state's rules of civil procedure. 3
The new RMBCA subchapter on demand and dismissal of derivative actions
represents an express effort to curtail the amount of such litigation, as well as the
type, given the restrictions noted above. Whether this model act would be so ap-
plied in practice remains to be seen. The practitioner should be aware of the cur-
rent status of his or her state's business corporation statute, and the changes the
amended RMBCA could entail for that statute. In addition, the possibility that
only part of the revised act's amendment would be adopted by a legislature could
lead to a mixed situation in terms of mandatory demand and a review standard ei-
ther less deferential or more so than that of the amended act.234
2. The ALI Proposal
The ALI proposal, like the amended RMBCA, makes demand mandatory, and
also allows for the filing of a derivative suit if demand was refused. It is markedly
different from the amended RMBCA and the Delaware approach in several re-
spects. The ALI proposal encompasses a higher level of judicial involvement, a
broader scope of judicial review, and less deference to justifications advanced by
the board under the business judgment rule.2 3 Depending on one's perspective,
these aspects could be viewed as an effort to "level the playing field" of derivative
litigation -the futility exception is discarded, but a "closerjudicial scrutiny" of the
substance of the plaintiffs allegations takes its place. To the corporate observer,
however, the field is probably level enough as it is, and the ALI proposal would
mean increased "judicial meddling" in areas a board would rather have cloaked in
the business judgment rule, and afforded great deference by a court. On the other
hand, if a minority stockholder seeking to bring a derivative claim had to choose
between a Delaware demand-required situation, the amended RMBCA, or the
ALI proposal, he or she would most probably choose the latter.
What the ALI proposal and the amended RMBCA have in common is that re-
garding even a derivative action which would clearly meet the futility exception
231. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
232. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, § 7.44(c)(1)-(3), at 1247.
233. Id. at 1249.
234. See also Block, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 6, at 499, 501.
235. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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under Delaware or other existing law, demand must still be made.236 While the
ALI proposal offers the best chance to the derivative plaintiff for merit review of
her claim,"' it is fair to ask why demand should be required in a case where it
would almost certainly be futile -particularly when the demand requirement car-
ries with it a process advantageous to the status quo which may be charged with
the wrongdoing in the first place. However, if futility is not to be an option, the
ALI proposal increases the derivative stockholder/plaintiffs opportunity for posi-
tive action.
The ALI proposal has been roundly criticized by some commentators for going
too far in its departure from Delaware law238 and the confines of the business judg-
ment rule.239 One criticism concerns the heightened judicial review afforded to
duty of loyalty cases under the ALl proposal.240 Another is that the ALI proposal
grossly underestimates the added cost to derivative proceedings which this process
could entail.241 Finally, these commentators charge that the ALI's proposal is
based on a theory of structural bias- that regardless of the actual "independence"
of a board or committee, the ALl presents a process of heavierjudicial review, due
to an alleged inherent bias in the board setting.242
3. The Kamen Decisions
The Seventh Circuit in Kamen stated that it "follow[ed] the tradition of Hawes
and use[d] federal common law" in its approach to the issue of demand futility.2"
The court acknowledged the Supreme Court cases which followed Hawes and "ar-
guably" adopted a futility exception prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 2 but
236. ALL, Tent. Draft No. 9, supra note 8, § 7.03, at 211; Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, §
7.42, at 1244-45 (amended RMBCA); Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1344, 1347.
237. ALI, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 120-21.
238. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 96. The authors compare existing Delaware law with the ALl proposal,
and offer a searing critique of the latter. As Professor Dooley and Mr. Veasey point out, both are members of an
ABA ad hoc committee designated to examine that proposal; the Committee on Corporate laws, which formu-
lated the amended RMBCA, is also a committee of the ABA. Id. at 503 n. 1. In addition, the authors noted that
Mr. Veasey is counsel of record for General Motors' outside directors in several derivative cases. Id. at 508 n.26.
239. See Block, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 6, at 503, 505-07 (citing Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman
Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current Act Proposals Compared, 44
Bus. LAw. 503, 534-35, 537-40 (1989)).
240. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 96, at 537 (duty of care versus duty of loyalty distinction does not affect the
judgment of those "assessing the conduct of someone else after the fact. To advance this argument in favor of
closer judicial review of board decisions on loyalty matters is to assert that independent directors are more likely
to risk their reputations to excuse cheating than to excuse carelessness.").
241. Id. at 524-29, 531-32. Interestingly, both the ALl proposal and the Amended RMBCA contain provisions
for awarding costs against a party pleading in bad faith, or pursuing a claim without reasonable cause. ALl Tent.
Draft No. 8, supra note 8, § 7.05, at 93-94; Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, § 7.46, at 1253-54
(amended RMBCA).
242. I.e., that the "independent" litigation committee named by the board cannot help but be slanted in favor of
the board. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 96, at 534-37; Block, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 6, at 504-
07. But see ALI, Tent. Draft No. 8, supra note 8, at 124-25 (the termination proceedings and review of Section
7.08 "does not depend on the view one takes on the issue of 'structural bias' ").
243. Kamen, 908 F2d at 1342. Hawes is the landmark case which stated a demand requirement. Hawes v.
Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881); see also supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
244. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). "There is no federal general common law." Id. at 72.
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stated that the cases did not prevent "the evolution of the federal common law."
245
The court also stated that these cases were interpreting former equity rules no
longer of consequence today, despite the fact that these rules were more than "ar-
guably" consistent precursors of present Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 246 The court also concluded that Rule 23.1 does not "create" a federal
demand requirement, but governs only what the complaint says in addressing the
demand matter.247 While the Supreme Court also stated that Rule 23.1 does not
itself "create" such a requirement, 2  the Rule's express language acknowledges
both the demand requirement and an exception to the making of that demand:
"The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the
plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable
authority . . . and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for
not making the effort." 249 To conclude that no futility exception exists would seem
to make the above language of Rule 23.1 at least superfluous, if not meaning-
less .25 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit stated that the trend of the 1970s, and
continuing today, that of the development and use of "independent" litigation com-
mittees (SLCs) in handling demand matters, "washed away" any assumption of
the early cases as to the incompetence of interested directors to act on demands.
That those directors may have taken part in the alleged wrongdoing, and/or
formed that "independent" committee themselves, was of no real consequence to
the court. The court continued down this winding path to create some "federal
common law" of its own -the abolition of the futility exception.2 l
The Supreme Court squarely rejected both the Seventh Circuit's universal de-
mand rule and the process through which the lower court had formulated the rule.
The Court also held that, independent of any state law concerns under Burks, the
futility exception to the demand requirement did not frustrate the policies of the
Investment Company Act.252 The Court had noted in its opinion that only a hand-
ful of states require a mandatory demand.253 If the law of one of these mandatory
demand states had been the underlying state law, one can speculate as to whether
the Supreme Court would have held as it did. In other words, if the amended
RMBCA or the ALI proposal were enacted in a state whose law provided the basis
for defining the demand requirement, would the Supreme Court stay with the
245. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1346.
246. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, supm note 36, at 488 (Rule 23.1 made no substantive change of previous
rules pertinent to derivative actions, and was intended to not alter the procedural balance already established;
"pre- 1966 decisions remain completely authoritative"); Fischel, supra note 32, at 171 n.23 (tracing the evolution
of former Equity Rule 94 to the present Rule 23.1).
247. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1341.
248. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1716.
249. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. l;see also Kamen, I llS. Ct. at 1716.
250. Under the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Rule 23.1 in Kamen, there could be no viable "reasons" for
not making a demand. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1344.
251. Id. at 1346-47.
252. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1718, 1720, 1722.
253. Id. at 1719 n.7 (Maryland, whose law was to apply as the state of incorporation, is not among those
states).
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Burks reasoning and allow that law to define the federal demand requirement? It
appears possible under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Kamen to take a fed-
erally based derivative claim, mix it with a state-law based mandatory demand re-
quirement, and end up with a mandatory demand requirement at the federal level.
However, a plaintiff bringing a federal derivative claim subject to another state's
law, i.e., one not requiring a mandatory demand, could have an entirely different
result.
The Supreme Court held in Kamen that the futility exception was not inconsis-
tent with the policies of the Investment Company Act.254 If the Court were pre-
sented with a state-based mandatory demand rule in the future, it would seem
inconsistent for the Court to hold that such a rule also did not conflict with the poli-
cies of that Act. The Court placed strong emphasis on state corporate law and the
use of that law in formulating federal law as it applied to the demand require-
ment.255 In no way did the Court hold that states were not free to adopt mandatory
demand rules, and it did not speculate as to how it would view such rules in deriva-
tive actions based on federal substantive law.
B. Assumptions and Realities
1. Independence "vanished in the haze"..256
One commentator briefly described the operation of a special litigation com-
mittee this way: "The 'independent' litigation committee ... investigates the
shareholder derivative action, usually with the aid of 'independent' special coun-
sel, accountants, and other experts. . . .The very appointment of the committee
may involve an inherent conflict of interest. '"257 The amended RMBCA, the ALI
proposal, and the Seventh Circuit's Kamen rationale all reject the possibility that a
truly "independent" special litigation committee simply may not be forthcoming
from the same group which both selects and compensates the SLC, and to which
the SLC is to give its "independent" inquiry and/or investigation.258 If such an in-
herent conflict is present in the creation and operation of SLCs, it is not given sig-
nificance under any of those scenarios.
254. Id. at 1722.
255. Id. at 1718-21.
256. Adapted from the musical composition "Help!", written by John Lennon & Paul McCartney. THE BEA-
TLES, Help! on THE BEATLES/1962-1966 (Capitol/EMI 1973).
257. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 44, § 367, at 1074, 1077. In an earlier case, speaking to the appointment
of directors by a controlling shareholder after a wrong had been alleged, the district judge stated:
The court should not cajole itself into believing that the members of a Board of Directors elected by the
dominant and accused majority stockholder, after accusations of wrongdoing have been made, were se-
lected for membership on the Board to protect the interests of the minority stockholders and to assure a
vigorous prosecution of effective litigation against the offending majority. Where we know that puppet
directors would at best only go though the motions, are we barred from considering who would be manip-
ulating the wires?
Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F Supp. 491,494 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
258. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1246-49 (amended RMBCA); ALI, Tent. Draft No. 8,
supra note 8, at 70-71, 173-74; Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1344-45.
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The Seventh Circuit observed that the demand requirement and the futility ex-
ception are all too often the center of litigation, rather than the actual merits of a
given case.25 9 The court also stated that questions raised by plaintiffs as to the in-
dependence of those handling the demand matter detracted from "the real is-
sues."260 However, if self-interest and possible lack of independence by directors or
others considering demand requests (or claims of futility) are not relevant ques-
tions, one must ask just what "the real issues" are of which the court spoke. That
this whole process will go more smoothly and produce less litigation should not
justify a demand process which may bury merited claims, particularly those
which may be "inextricably intertwined" with a bias of the board.
Possibly the real conclusion to be made here is that if the interest of the directors
and/or a lack of independence on their part is not a real cause for concern, and a
high level of deference to those directors' business judgment is to be given to their
original conduct and their consideration of the requested derivative claim- a def-
erence which may exclude any real merit review, then the survival of an effective
derivative claim, even a meritorious one, is in extreme doubt under the "new
wave" of mandatory demand. The point may be to indeed foreclose such claims,
unless the board happens to agree with the premises of the complaint and will take
it forward. While the Seventh Circuit did stress the need to get to "the merits" of a
complaint, whether it would be possible to do just that under that court's interpre-
tation of the business judgment rule is doubtful. In addition, the same concern is
raised by the process of the amended RMBCA. While the Seventh Circuit en-
dorsed the ALI proposal, the court's methodology and deferential view of board
independence is more akin to that of the amended RMBCA. Although both the
Seventh Circuit's result and method of reaching it in Kamen were solidly re-
nounced by the Supreme Court in its opinion,261 that rationale is available for
adoption by either a state legislature formulating a demand requirement or a state
court interpreting such.2"2 In fact, the Official Comment of the amended RMBCA
borrowed from a similar Easterbrook rationale.263
It well may be unworkable to answer "it can't be done" to the question of how
can a corporation form an independent-in-fact SLC. However, there is a strong
analogy to be made between an "independent" SLC, sworn to objective inquiry of
the corporation which both formed it and pays its fees, and the use of expert wit-
259. Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1342.
260. See id. at 1345 ("Framing questions about the independence of the directors as exceptions to the demand
requirement diverts attention from the real issues.").
261. Kamen, 111S. Ct. at 1718-23.
262. See Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1346 ("Although none of these [prior circuit] opinions dispenses with the excep-
tion altogether, the day is at hand -unless decisions of the Supreme Court bar the way."). The Court's decision in
Kamen did just that, although applying state law adopted from the amended RMBCA or the ALl proposal could
yield the same result the Seventh Circuit sought.
263. See supra notes 141, 200 and accompanying text. The Official Comment cited with approval the same
portion of Judge Easterbrook's concurrence in Starrels, 870 F.2d at 1173-74, which reads quite similarly to his
rationale in Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1342-43. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 4, at 1252 (amended
RMBCA).
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nesses in the trial setting: Yes, the experts testifying at trial are "experts," but ev-
eryone at the trial knows or learns for whom the expert is testifying, and that he or
she is being compensated for the appearance. And, to be sure, the party presenting
the expert would not have him or her on the stand unless the party knew the testi-
mony would be favorable to the party's case. While the expert may be presented at
trial as an "independent" expert, surely the inherent bias is obvious. At trial, both
sides can present the opinions of such experts, giving an element of fair play. How-
ever, in the derivative demand setting, only one side, the corporation/board, gets
the benefit of the use of such "independent" persons, some of whom may be "ex-
perts." Under either the ALI proposal, the amended RMBCA, or the Seventh Cir-
cuit's rationale in Kamen, the determination of a nominally autonomous SLC
could survive a challenge by the shareholder or the limited review of a court.
When this type of "independence" is combined with the business judgment rule's
deferential protection of board and SLC actions, then the burden on the derivative
stockholder/plaintiff becomes insurmountable. Perhaps the "independence," real
or apparent, of the SLC would indeed "vanish in the haze" 64of the business judge-
ment rule.
2. "Much Ado About Nothing,"265 or Much More?
One could take the view that the above proposals do not really represent sub-
stantive changes in derivative litigation, but are instead an altering of the proce-
dural "hoops" through which one must pass in order to effectively commence a
derivative suit; that the burden on the plaintiff of carrying forward a claim is
heavy under any procedural scenario, and that that is as it should be. For a corpo-
ration to be successful, managers must be allowed to manage. If directors and offi-
cers do not have the requisite freedom to formulate and implement policy, and
steer the corporation in a course of its best interests, then the progress of the com-
pany's efforts is stymied, and the value of the shareholders' investment de-
creased.266 Included in this need for "directional freedom" is the capacity for
efficiently dealing with actions based on harassment and strike suits. An unwill-
ingness to meet the derivative plaintiff halfway may be based in some instances on
a decision not to pursue "silly or frivolous claims. "267 "Why should the plaintiffs be
authorized to sue, and without so much as a request to the board, just because the
complaint is all heat and no light?"268
Balanced against this concern are those of investors who may think their only
viable option for avoiding severe damages to their investments is through a deriva-
tive suit. While these actions may be voluminous in number, and even feature a
264. See supra note 259.
265. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MucH ADO ABOUT NOTHING (1598).
266. See, e.g., Kamen, 908 F.2d at 1342-43.
267. Id. at 1345.
268. Id.
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familiar cast of parties,26 the need for relief may be genuine. The amended
RMBCA and the Seventh Circuit's Kamen rationale represent a lessening of the
chance that the truly meritorious claims will "rise to the top" for appropriate reme-
dial action. If this proves to be so, then the changes brought under those respective
approaches will be much more than "just" procedural. Whether the ALI pro-
posal's trade-off, that of the futility exception for increased judicial scrutiny,
would actually preserve merited derivative claims could only be known if
adopted.
3. Whose Corporation is it, Anyway?
Derivative litigation, by definition, involves a shareholder bringing an action
on behalf of the corporation, rather than as an action brought on a personal
right.27 Implicit in the litigation process is that the corporation has the opportu-
nity to bring the action on its own behalf, and hence the demand requirement.
Also fundamental to the corporate structure is that the shareholders own the cor-
poration, while the board manages it.27' The board must have the requisite level of
"control" in order to act in the corporation's best interests, including an effective
handling of impending litigation, be it "legitimate" actions or strike suits. 72 That
level of control must be high enough to act quickly and efficiently in addressing
problems and capitalizing on opportunities.
However, the shareholders still own the show, even if it is the directors' and offi-
cers' show to run. Notwithstanding the directors' need for validation of board
actions and liability protection under the business judgment rule, the ownership
interest of the shareholder as expressed through the corporation's actions (or inac-
tion) should be paramount. The minority shareholder, in particular, needs a means
through which he or she can assert, as an owner, a legitimate interest of the corpo-
269. Regarding the recurring pattern of the same parties, in the following shareholder derivative cases the
named plaintiff is "Harry Lewis": Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1983) (summary judgment for de-
fendant affirmed); Lewis v. Graves, 701 .2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983) (demand not excused); Lewis v. Knutson, 699
F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary judgement for defendant); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (excusal possible, remanded); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980) (dismissal affirmed); Lewis v. Hilton, 648 F Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (complaint dismissed); Lewis v. Sporck, 646 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (dismissed with leave to
amend); Lewis v. Anselmi, 564 F Supp. 768 (D.C.N.Y. 1983) (dismissed); Lewis v. Valley, 476 F Supp. 62
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dismissed); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (remanded with leave to amend);
Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985) (motion to dismiss denied). This list is illustrative only, and not
intended to be exhaustive. See also DeMott, supra note 35, at 495 n. 154 (citing Lewis v. Anderson, 453 A.2d
474,475 n. I (Del. Ch. 1982), affd, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984) ("confirming continued corporeal existence of
habitual plaintiff; disproving thesis that 'Harry Lewis' was a 'street name' employed by various counsel.")).
270. See supra note 1.
271. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 44, § 188, at 491.
272. See supra note 12.
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ration which the latter, through its management, resists or would otherwise
refuse. 
273
A particular instance in which mandatory demand could frustrate this opportu-
nity is that of closely-held corporations, in which the number of shareholders is
relatively low. These corporations may be composed of mostly members of the
same family and a few additional investors. If one family or group controls the
board, or is the board, then the minority shareholder with a merited claim faces an
unfair disadvantage in a mandatory demand setting. The better course would al-
low that shareholder to plead futility and go on with her claim, and not be strad-
dled with potential delay tactics of the board, and the possibility of not even
surviving the demand stage.274
While strike suits may always be present in the corporate arena, the legitimate
claims of minority and other shareholders must have accessibility to bona fide ad-
judication and remedy, or perhaps the actual significance of that ownership inter-
est will be inconsequential when the time comes to act on a threat to the entity in
which that interest lies. 275 The disposition of meritless claims, harassment
actions, and strike suits in an efficient manner which legitimizes the board's role is
a worthy objective. However, if the bona fide derivative claim of the shareholder
is caught in this same mechanism of "efficiency," then the owner will have little
real access to that which he or she owns.276
V. CONCLUSION
The longstanding tradition of the demand requirement in derivative litigation
dates from the late 19th century.277 Of almost as lengthy a tradition is the futility
exception to that demand requirement. The amended Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, and a recent proposal of the American Law Institute, and the
Seventh Circuit's rationale in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. 278 would
abolish this exception, and also heighten the burden of the shareholder seeking to
273. An alternate dispute resolution mechanism which could be given consideration in the derivative context is
arbitration. The typical advantages of arbitration over litigation in terms of a faster process at a possibly lesser
expense could be attractive features for both the shareholder and the corporation. If the scope of review available
to the arbitrator was not "buried" by deference to the business judgment rule, then perhaps in this venue the plain-
tiff would have a better opportunity to make his or her case and do so in an objective setting. The corporation
might find this mechanism effective in disposing of strike suits more quickly than under the various situations of
demand-refused, demand-excused, or mandatory demand with special litigation committee involvement.
274. See, e.g., Marquis Theatre, 846 F.2d at 87-88, 90-91 (plaintiff owned 22.5% of corporation, defendant
and his family owned the remainder, defendant and his wife composed entire board of directors, and he was chief
executive officer; demand held futile).
275. The shareholder cannot simply bring a direct action to protect that interest, if the interest is actually deriv-
ative. See Sax v. World Wide Press, Inc., 809 F.2d 610, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1987).
276. This comment is not intended to be "pro-plaintiff" or "anti-corporation." However, one can acknowledge
the corporation's need for increased efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with the proliferation of derivative
litigation, and even endorse in principle efforts to bring that about, and still express a legitimate concern for the
rights of the shareholder, especially the minority shareholder. The "plaintiff in a derivative action could be an-
other company which is a minority shareholder, and one which traditionally uses defense-oriented firms for rep-
resentation.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 19-34.
278. 908 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990), rev d, 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
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bring a derivative suit. The amended RMBCA and the ALI proposal are available
for adoption by state legislatures, and the Seventh Circuit's Kamen rationale could
be borrowed by the states as well. What was already a tough road may also be-
come more narrow.
